The primary question in ethical inquiry: how ought we to morally live our lives? The problem then becomes how to answer this question — while some turn to philosophy, others turn to religion. The issue lies not in the people who seek answers from religion rather than philosophy, but in those who conflate the two. The goal of this paper is to establish that this determination is to be made strictly in the field of ethics, and by doing so accentuate the reasons ethical inquiry and religion do not mix. Religion, for the sake of this paper, can be defined as a collection of beliefs, behaviors, practices, texts, teachings, and worldviews, shared by the members of a group, society and culture, and determined by the members, texts, leaders and posited gods of the group. The arguments presented apply to any religion that fits this description, though they are primarily intended to discuss the role of Western religion in moral decision-making. The argument presented in this paper takes this form: (1) if the morality of act tokens must be determined by the doctrines of the agent’s religion, then the teachings of religion, pertaining to ethics, are sound moral theories; (2) it is not the case that the teachings of religion, pertaining to ethics, are sound moral theories; (3) therefore, it is not the case that the morality of act tokens must be determined by the doctrines of the agent’s religion.
Those sympathetic to premise one argue that the morally right action can only be determined through their religion and its teachings. Religious doctrines are often said to come from God, which implies this theory is quite similar to divine command theory — the belief that one ought to behave in the way God commands. The distinction here is that the proponents of this position do not act solely at the whim of God; their motivation comes from their belief that their religion and its doctrines are the truth. C. Stephen Layman argues that without God, and perhaps an afterlife, there is no motivation to act in the morally right way — that there can be no moral obligations without a God to enforce them, and perhaps an afterlife to serve as reward for adherence to religious teachings. He argues that religion can be the only motivation to perform the morally right act in situations where there is reason to believe the morally wrong act is more beneficial, or provides a greater reward, to the agent. Kai Nielsen disputes this idea, claiming that humans could behave morally in society regardless of the existence of God or the guidance of religion. Nielsen agrees with Layman and the religious that, without religion, humankind lacks an overarching meaning, but also claims that a divine purpose in life is unnecessary; he goes on to describe how no evidence exists to suggest that the religious are more morally considerate than the non-religious. Similarly, James Rachels argues that religion and ethics are incompatible. Ethics is the study of human behavior and autonomous decision-making, and humans’ autonomy would surely be lost if a person must act in accordance with God and their religion in every scenario — if we are to act only in the way God commands, then we never truly have the ability to choose our own behavior. It must be mentioned that a similar dilemma is addressed in Plato’s Euthyphro, in which the character Socrates debates with Euthyphro the nature of divine command and its role in determining our behavior, concluding that divine command and morality are incompatible: adherence to God’s commands either leads to the following of arbitrary rules, or a moral system that exists independent of God’s psychology. To avoid redundancy, this paper is meant to dispute religion’s role in ethics, not just God’s.
The goal of moral philosophy is to determine, through theoretical inquiry and debate, the best way to act in any given scenario. Religion has existed just as long and, to many, serves the same purpose of determining the best behavior for humankind, though through radically different methods. Philosophy is ever-changing, progressive, and full of opposing beliefs and thoughts; religion consists of adherence to history and tradition and is slow to change. Despite their inherent differences, many people seek to answer the questions posed by moral philosophers with their religious doctrines. Religions teach that people have a purpose in the world, and that a being more powerful than themselves will provide reward or punishment depending on their behavior — if this is the case, it is no wonder that pleasing this being would be of great significance, and that only from the leaders and teachings of the religion could one learn what behavior is right. An independent justification of the obligations of mankind would be tailored heavily around these doctrines. Why is it the case that religion should so heavily impact morality? Layman claims that moral obligations result in sacrifices, and that without sufficient motivation no one would willingly perform such sacrifices; the sufficient reasoning for him is the afterlife.
He states his argument as such: (1) in every actual case, one has the most reason to do what is morally required (one has the most reason to do act x iff the strongest relevant reasons favor doing x); (2) if there is no God and no life after death, then there are cases in which morality requires that one make a great sacrifice that confers relatively modest benefits (or prevents relatively modest harm); (3) if in a given situation one must make a great sacrifice in order to do what is morally required, but the sacrifice confers relatively modest benefits (or prevents relatively modest harm), then one does not have most reason to do what is morally required.
Layman’s arguments are meant to show that an independent determination of the permissibility and obligatoriness of actions is not sufficient motivation to do the right thing, in all circumstances. Cases can easily be constructed where an act of theft, like Robin Hood’s, could vastly improve a poverty-stricken person’s life with little consequence beyond the morally wrong act of theft itself. Layman posits religion as the only adequate justification to persuade people to behave morally in these situations — these cases seem to suggest that morality is performed so as to add merit to one’s character, in the event that some all-knowing being is aware of all the good and bad acts that have been committed. It begs the question, however, whether judgment is the only reason people ought to do the right thing. The simpler alternative is that people should want to do what is right because we all want to be the best possible versions of ourselves; it should not take the potential of eternal punishment to be willing to behave in the right manner.
It is sometimes argued by religious apologists that only if there is a God who can punish men will we be assured that naturally selfish men will be fair and considerate of others. Without this punitive sanction or threat men would go wild. Men will respect the rights of others only if they fear a wrathful and angry God. Yet it hardly seems to be the case that Christians, with their fear of hell, have been any better at respecting the rights of others than non-Christians. A study of the Middle Ages or the conquest of the non-Christian world makes this plain enough. And even if it were true (as it is not) that Christians were better in this respect than non-Christians, it would not show that they had a superior moral reason for their behavior, for in so acting and in so reasoning, they are not giving a morally relevant reason at all but are simply acting out of fear for their own hides. Yet Christian morality supposedly takes us beyond the clash of the rival egoisms of secular life.
Nielsen accurately deconstructs why it is irrational to believe that divine punishment or reward is capable of impacting human behavior — hundreds of years of history prove the contrary, and even if this weren’t the case, those using fear of God or punishment in the afterlife as justification for action would not be engaging in sound moral reasoning. Nielsen’s point is that the potential religious implications of an action are insufficient to establish religion as a moral theory.
The religious still might support premise one — that an act is only morally right if it is in accordance with their chosen religion. Their justification: that God is a being worthy of worship, and our actions should reflect positively upon him. Religion, in essence, is paying humble respect to the more powerful being thought to have brought us into existence — if we are the creations of an entity greater than ourselves, we should be grateful and act to honor the gift of life we have been given. Rachels responds to this by pointing out that the very concept of worship is contrary to religious beliefs, using this to put pressure on the existence of God from the implications of this belief. His argument is constructed like this: (1) if any being is God, then he must be a fitting object of worship; (2) no being could possibly be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one’s role as an autonomous moral agent; (3) therefore, there cannot be any being who is God.
While the existence of God is not a matter of concern here, the first two premises are. If God exists, then the institutions of religion are right in worshiping him; the problem Rachels addresses, however, is that worship results in total obedience to the higher being, resulting in the loss of one’s autonomy and ability to act otherwise. Religious followers would act in the way their religion commanded, but in doing so would oppose the concept central to religion of free will. Again, the justification for using religion in moral determination fails, and for good reason — moral philosophy is the area of inquiry specifically designated for exploring proper moral behavior, and religion has no good justification for entering into the debate.
Religion has been separated from science for decades, justified by the fact that the scientific process is only hindered by leading inquiry to align with religion. If the past several centuries are anything to go on, it is clear that outdated beliefs stunt the development and discovery involved in science. Moral philosophy exists outside the realm of science but still within that of human inquiry — is it not the case that philosophy deserves the same respect of acting and expanding outside the constraints of religion? I believe that religion has been thoroughly discredited in the realm of moral philosophy, and that in order to develop better theories the field must move away from religion. The burden of proof lies on the religious to show that a creator exists, and its relevance not just to ethics but to philosophy in general — though if this were to happen, it would have to be some version of religion free of the rituals and traditions that have no place in the field of academia. It amazes me that all other aspects of education have moved the curriculum so far from religion, yet it persists so apparently in philosophy as a whole. The issue lies particularly in people using reasoning that does not belong to justify their behavior as morally permissible. Ethics and religion simply do not mix.